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Abstract
This article introduces the conjecture that mathematics, logic and re-
lated disciplines may usefully be understood as information compression
by ‘multiple alignment’, ‘unification’ and ‘search’.
As a preparation for the two main sections of the article, concepts of
Hartley-Shannon information theory and Algorithmic Information The-
ory are briefly reviewed together with a summary of the essentials of the
simpler ‘standard’ methods for information compression. Related areas
of research are briefly described: philosophical connections, information
compression (IC) in brains and nervous systems, and IC in relation to
inductive inference, Minimum Length Encoding and probabilistic reason-
ing. Then the concepts of information compression by ‘multiple align-
ment’, ‘unification’ and ‘search’ (ICMAUS) are outlined together with a
brief description of the SP61 computer model that is a partial realisation
of the ICMAUS framework.
The first of the two main sections describes how many of the
commonly-used forms and structures in mathematics, logic and related
disciplines (such as theoretical linguistics and computer programming)
may be seen as devices for IC. In some cases, these forms and structures
may be interpreted in terms of the ICMAUS framework.
The second main section describes a selection of examples where pro-
cesses of calculation and inference in mathematics, logic and related dis-
ciplines may be understood as IC. In many cases, these examples may
be understood more specifically in terms of the ICMAUS concepts and
illustrated with output from the SP61 model.
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Associated issues are briefly discussed.
Abbreviations used in the article: IC—information compression;
ICMAUS—information compression by multiple alignment, unification
and search; MA—multiple alignment; ML—mathematics and logic;
MLE—Minimum Length Encoding; OOD—object-oriented design;
PCS—Post Canonical System; UTM—Universal Turing Machine.
Keywords: mathematics, logic, information compression, theory of
computing, multiple alignment, Universal Turing Machine, ICMAUS.
1 Introduction
This article introduces some conjectural ideas about the foundations of mathe-
matics, logic and related disciplines such as theoretical linguistics and computer
programming. In this context, ‘mathematics’ means the the subject itself rather
than mathematical method. For the sake of brevity, the expression ‘mathemat-
ics, logic and related disciplines’ will be referred to as ‘ML’1.
In broad terms, the article examines how information theory may illumi-
nate the nature of ML, an approach to the subject that seems to have received
little or no attention in the past. Here, ‘information theory’ encompasses Shan-
non’s (1949) information theory and the more recently developed ‘algorithmic
information theory’ (see, for example, Li and Vita´nyi, 1997).
In brief, the main conjecture to be discussed is the proposition that:
Mathematics, logic and related disciplines may usefully be understood
as information compression by ‘multiple alignment’, ‘unification’ and
‘search’.
The concepts of information compression (IC), multiple alignment (MA), unifi-
cation and search (collectively abbreviated as ICMAUS) will be described.
As will be seen, the conjecture will be discussed in relation to the ‘static’
representation of concepts in ML, and also in relation to the ‘dynamics’ of ML
inferences: ‘calculation’, ‘proof’, ‘deduction’ etc.
For many readers, it may seem strange to suppose that there should be
any significant connection between ML and IC. After all, IC is the function
performed by those humble but useful computer utilities like PkZip and WinZip
that can be used to reduce the sizes of files but do not otherwise seem to have
any particular significance. In this article, I hope to show that there are many
other facets to IC than what is apparent in compression utilities and that there
are deep intellectual roots to the ideas to be described.
There are no formal proofs in this article and indeed formal proofs in this
context are probably inappropriate since the argumentation depends on one’s
sense of analogy and what is or has potential to be intellectually fruitful. The
treatment of the proposals is very far from being exhaustive: the article merely
introduces some ideas in support of the proposals and presents a selection of
1Not to be confused with the programming language of the same name.
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examples. Whether or how the ideas may be applied to the many areas of ML
not discussed in this article are matters that readers may like to consider.
1.1 ‘COMPUTING’, ML AND IC
In another article (Wolff, 1999b), I have suggested that the intuitive concept of
‘computing’ may be understood as ICMAUS. If the arguments in that article
are accepted, and if ‘computing’ is seen to include ML, then the present article
might be thought to be redundant.
However, the purpose of the previous article is to show that the workings
of a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) and the workings of a Post Canonical
System (PCS) may be understood in terms of ICMAUS and to discuss how
this interpretation suggests how the UTM and PCS models may, with profit,
be augmented so that the practical benefits of the augmentation outweigh the
costs. By contrast, the purpose of this article is to show how specific aspects
of ML other than UTMs or PCSs may be understood in terms IC and, more
specifically in some cases, in terms of ICMAUS. The two articles may be seen
to be complementary rather than competing.
Since it is clear that computers can be used to decompress information as well
as compress it, readers may reasonably ask whether it is sensible to propose that
‘computing’ may be understood as IC. What I believe is a satisfactory resolution
of the paradox of “decompression by compression” is discussed briefly in Section
5.1 and more fully in Wolff (2000).
1.2 PRESENTATION
The main sections of this article are as follows:
• Section 2, next, is a preparation for two main sections that follow.
• Section 3, which is the first of the two main sections, presents arguments
and examples in support of the idea that ML forms and structures can of-
ten be understood in terms of IC. The possible application of the ICMAUS
concepts is considered briefly.
• Section 4, the second of the two main sections, describes how a range of
ML processes of calculation and inference can be understood in terms of
IC, and shows with examples and output from the SP61 model how the
ICMAUS concepts may be applied.
• Section 5 briefly considers a range of issues that relate to the ideas that
have been described.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 REPRESENTATION, SEMANTICS AND PLATON-
ISM
In mathematics and logic, it is often convenient to make a distinction between
the representation of an ML entity and the thing itself (the meaning or ‘se-
mantics’ associated with the representation). Thus the concept four may be
represented by ‘four’, ‘4’, ‘IV’, ‘1111’ (in unary arithmetic), ‘100’ (in binary
arithmetic), and so on.
In mathematical Platonism, mathematical entities “are not merely formal
or quantitative structures imposed by the human mind on natural phenomena,
nor are they only mechanically present in phenomena as a brute fact of their
concrete being. Rather, they are numinous and transcendent entities, existing
independently of both the phenomena they order and the human mind that
perceives them.” (Hersh, 1997, pp. 95–96). Such ideas are “invisible, apprehen-
sible by intelligence only, and yet can be discovered to be the formative causes
and regulators of all empirical visible objects and processes.” (ibid. p. 95).
The view of mathematical (and logical) concepts that has been adopted here
is quite different. It is assumed that both the representations of ML concepts and
the concepts themselves are ‘information’ in a technical sense (to be described
in Section 2.2). If it is accepted that brains and computers are valid vehicles
for ML concepts and ML processes of calculation and inference, it is difficult
to resist the conclusion that ML concepts must exist within those systems in
some relatively concrete form—arrays of binary digits in digital computers or, in
brains, something like ‘cell assemblies’, patterns of nerve impulses or, perhaps,
DNA or RNA sequences. There is no place for “numinous and transcendent
entities” in a Platonic world outside the brain or computer.
Do Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems pose a problem for this non-Platonist
view? Discussion of that issue would take us well beyond the scope of this
article. We can at least say that any such problem is neither more nor less than
it would be for any artificial computing system.
2.2 INFORMATION COMPRESSION
As a preparation for the rest of the article, this subsection presents an outline
view of IC, picking out what I regard as the key ideas. A much fuller and more
technical presentation may be found in text books such as Cover and Thomas
(1991).
The advent of computers has made familiar the idea that ‘information’ of all
kinds - speech, writing, paintings, diagrams, music, and so on can be translated
into arrays of binary digits (‘0’ and ‘1’—‘bits’) stored in computer memory or
on disk. These arrays may be one-dimensional sequences, or arrays in two or
more dimensions.
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2.2.1 Randomness and Redundancy
Arrays or patterns of information like those just mentioned may be totally ran-
dom (something that rarely occurs in practical applications) and we judge the
information to be totally lacking in ‘structure’.2
Most of the information we encounter in practical applications is not random
but is structured in some way. This means that the information contains redun-
dancy, a technical concept with a meaning that is quite close to the everyday
meaning of ‘surplus to requirements’. If there is redundancy in a given body of
information, I,3 there is, in effect, repetition of information. And information
that is repeated is, in terms of communication, unnecessary.4
2.2.2 Hartley-Shannon Information Theory and Algorithmic Infor-
mation Theory
In the Hartley-Shannon concept of information, I contains the maximum possi-
ble information for the given alphabet of symbol types if the absolute and condi-
tional probabilities of all the symbol types in I are equal (see Cover and Thomas,
1991). In this case, I is random and contains no redundancy. If there are vari-
ations amongst the probabilities, I contains less than the maximum possible
information for the given symbol types and, for that reason, it is not random
and contains redundancy. The redundancy in I is the difference between the
information it actually contains and the maximum possible information for the
given alphabet of symbol types.
These concepts of randomness and redundancy are often useful but can be
difficult to apply in a sensible way if I is small. Alternative but complementary
concepts, that do not suffer from this weakness, form part of the foundation of
Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT), pioneered by Solomonoff, Kolmogorov,
Chaitin and others (see Li and Vita´nyi, 1997).
The key idea in AIT is that I is random if no computer program can be
discovered or designed that generates I but is smaller than I in the sense that
it contains fewer symbols. If any such program can be discovered or designed,
2In this research, the term pattern has been adopted to mean an array of one or more
symbols, including a one-dimensional array or sequence of symbols, an array of symbols in two
or more dimensions and also a subset of symbols within a larger array where the symbols in
the subset need not be contiguous within the larger array. Although most of the examples
in this article are about sequences, the term pattern will generally be used in this article in
preference to the word sequence for the sake of generality. Notice that an array of symbols
can be as small as a single symbol.
In this research, the term symbol means an atomic ‘mark’ that can be differentiated in a
yes/no manner from other symbols.
The meanings of pattern, symbol and other concepts used in this research are defined in
Appendix A of Wolff (1999a).
3Here and throughout this article, the phrase “a given body of information” or “the given
body of information” will be abbreviated as ‘I’.
4Of course, redundancy can be useful in other ways: guarding against loss of information
(as in the use of backup copies or mirror disks in computing), in speeding up processing in
databases that are distributed over a wide area, or in aiding the correction of errors when
information is corrupted (as in error-correcting codes).
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then I is not random and contains redundancy. For all instances of I except
very small ones, it is not possible to prove that there is no computer program
that will generate I but is smaller than I—because failure to find or devise such
a program within a given time does not exclude the possibility that one may
be found later. Thus, in the great majority of cases, it is not possible to prove
that any I is random although the opposite may be proved in particular cases.
2.2.3 Redundancy and the Repetition of Symbols and Patterns
Very often, redundancy in I takes the form of repeating patterns, including the
repetition of single symbols. Consider, for example, a sequence like this: ‘a a a
a a a a a a a b a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a’. In this sequence, the frequency and
thus the (absolute) probability of ‘a’ is very much higher than the frequency
or probability of ‘b’ so the sequence clearly contains redundancy in terms of
the Hartley-Shannon theory. Likewise, the sequence contains redundancy in
terms of the AIT concepts of randomness and redundancy because it can be
compressed into a ‘program’ for generating the sequence that looks something
like this: ‘pr(a[10], b, a[15])’, where ‘pr’ means ‘print’.
In other examples of I containing redundancy, it may be much less easy
to see the redundancy as repetition of patterns. And in some cases, such as
long sequences of the decimal values of π, it may be very hard to see any
kind of structure or redundancy at all, although decimal expansions of π (apart
from very small ones) are known to be highly redundant because they can
be generated by a relatively short computer program. Notwithstanding the
difficulty of seeing repeating patterns in examples like this, a working hypothesis
in this research is that all kinds of redundancy may, ultimately, be understood
in terms of the repetition of patterns.
2.2.4 IC and the Unification of Matching Patterns
IC is achieved by the removal of some at least of the redundancy in I, with or
without the removal of some of the non-redundant information too.
If redundant information is removed from I and all the non-redundant in-
formation is retained, then in principle and usually in practice it is possible
to reconstruct I in its original form with complete fidelity. This is lossless IC.
Clearly, lossless compression is not possible if there is no detectable redundancy
in I.
If some of the non-redundant information is removed from I together with
the removal of redundant information, it is never possible to reconstruct I with
complete fidelity. This is lossy IC. If the degradation of I is not too great, lossy
IC may be adopted for some applications because it can be achieved more quickly
than lossless IC, or more cheaply, or because it leads to greater compression, or
all these things.
The sobriquet ‘SP’ is sometimes used as an alternative name for ICMAUS
and associated ideas because IC may be understood as a reduction in redun-
dancy in a body of information—thus increasing Simplicity—whilst preserving
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as much as possible of the non-redundant descriptive Power.
The fact that redundancy often manifests itself as repeating patterns (Sec-
tion 2.2.3) suggests a simple method for finding and removing redundancy: look
for patterns that repeat in I—by systematically comparing or matching patterns
against each other—and then merge or unify two or more instances of a given
pattern to make a single instance.5 All the simpler ‘standard’ techniques for IC
(such as PkZip) operate in this way (see, for example, Storer, 1988). A corollary
of the working hypothesis that all kinds of redundancy may be seen as repeating
patterns is that all kinds of technique for IC, including the more elaborate ones,
may be seen to work by the unification of matching patterns.
Notice that the concept of counting the number of instances of a pattern
implies the matching of patterns against each other to establish that they are
instances of the given pattern. And the concept of frequency of a given pattern
implies the unification of the several instances to form a representative ‘type’
instance of the pattern. Since the concept of probability in this context is a nor-
malised expression of frequencies, it is apparent that there is a strong connection
between the concept of probability used in Hartley-Shannon information theory
and the notions of matching and unification of patterns. Of course, all of the
foregoing also applies to symbols and symbol types.
2.2.5 Three Techniques for IC by the Matching and Unification of
Patterns
This section describes three techniques for achieving IC by matching and unifica-
tion of patterns and principles that apply in all three cases. The first technique,
which we shall call chunking-with-codes is the most basic technique. The other
two may be seen to be variants of it.
• Chunking-with-Codes. If two or more matching patterns in I are unified
to form a single ‘type’ pattern, the result is lossy compression. This is
because the location of each of the original patterns is lost. To avoid
this loss of non-redundant information, the chunk (pattern) of information
may be assigned a relatively short name, ‘tag’, ‘identifier’ or ‘code’.6 Then
copies of this code are placed in each location where copies of the pattern
originally appeared, thus preserving the information about the original
locations of the given pattern.
This chunking-with-codes technique is so widespread and ‘natural’ that
we hardly notice it: in this article, the abbreviation ‘IC’ is used as a
short ‘code’ for the relatively long pattern ‘information compression’; a
citation like ‘Storer (1988)’ may be seen as a code for the relatively long
bibliographic details of the book given in the references section of the
5Notice that the use of the terms ‘unify’ and ‘unification’ in this article is distinct from the
use of those terms in logic. Here, they refer to a simple merging of patterns that match each
other, a meaning that is related to but simpler than the meanings of those terms in logic.
6The meaning of the word ‘code’ in this context is ‘name’ or ‘identifier’ and not the same
as the meaning of the word in cryptography.
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article; in everyday speaking and writing, names of people, places and so
on may all be regarded as relatively short codes for concepts where the full
description in each case represents a relatively large body of information.
No doubt, readers can think of many other examples.
• Schema-plus-Correction. A variant of the basic chunking-with-codes tech-
nique is another technique that is often called schema-plus-correction. In
this case, the unified pattern is not a monolithic chunk but is a chunk con-
taining gaps or holes within which a variety of other patterns may appear
on different occasions. In this case, the unified pattern is the schema and
the other patterns that fill the gaps are corrections to or completions of
the schema.
In everyday life, a common example is a menu in a restaurant. In this
case the schema is the basic framework of the menu, e.g., ‘Starter ... main
course ... sweet course ...’ and the ‘corrections’ are the dishes chosen to
fill the gaps. Another example is any kind of form with fields that will
be filled with various ‘corrections’ or completions each time the form is
completed.
• Run-Length Coding. If a sequence of symbols contains a pattern that
repeats in a sequence of instances that are contiguous, one with the next,
then IC can be achieved by reducing the repeating series to one instance
with something to mark the repetition or, for fully lossless compression,
with something to show the number of repetitions. For example, the
pattern ‘a x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z b’ may
be reduced to something like ‘a (x y z)* b’ in the case of lossy compression
or, for lossless compression, something like ‘a (x y z)[10] b’.
This kind of run-length coding can always be expressed using a ‘recursive’
function—one that contains one or more calls to itself, either directly or
via calls to other functions (see Section 3.4.1).
2.2.6 Using Short Codes for Frequent Patterns and Long Codes for
Rare Patterns
Other things being equal, there is a clear advantage in terms of IC if pattern
types that occur frequently in I have shorter codes than ones that are rare. A
well-known scheme that generates variable-length codes precisely geared to this
principle is Huffman coding (see Cover and Thomas, 1991).
2.2.7 The Complexity of Searching and the Need for Constraints
The idea of matching and unifying patterns is simple enough in itself but can
be complex to apply, especially if we allow partial matches like the matching of
‘x z’ with the first and third characters in ‘x y z’. For most patterns, the size of
the search space is astronomically large. Given that search spaces are normally
so large, it is not normally possible to search them exhaustively. In the vast
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majority of cases, it is necessary to constrain the search in some way, either
eliminating parts of the search space a priori (e.g., by restricting the search to
exact matches) or by applying heuristic techniques or both these things.
In heuristic search, the search is conducted in stages with a narrowing of the
search space at each stage using some measure of ‘goodness’ to choose where
the next stage of searching will be concentrated. In the present context, it is
appropriate to use some kind of measure of IC as the measure of ‘goodness’ of
matches.
2.3 THE PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO ESTAB-
LISHED IDEAS
The various ‘isms’ in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics and
logic—foundationism, logicism, intuitionism (constructivism), formalism, Pla-
tonism, neo-Fregeanism, humanism, structuralism and so on—are well de-
scribed in various sources (see, for example, Potter (2000); Hersh (1997); Craig
(1998); Hart (1996); Barrow (1992); Eves (1990); Epstein and Carnielli (1989);
Boolos and Jeffrey (1980)) and there is no intention to describe them again here.
Insofar as the embryonic ideas to be presented constitute any kind of phi-
losophy of ML, it seems that they do not fit easily into any of the existing isms
or schools of thought about the philosophy and foundations of ML.
2.3.1 Possible Connections
Devlin’s interesting ideas about logic and information (Devlin, 1991) might be
thought to be related to the present proposals because a concept of information
is fundamental in ICMAUS. However, Devlin develops a concept of information
that is different from the ‘standard’ concepts of Hartley-Shannon information
theory and AIT that have been adopted in the present work. Perhaps more
important is the fact that IC does not have any role in his proposals in contrast
to the ICMAUS proposals where IC has a key significance.
Two recent books about mathematics suggest in their titles that mathemat-
ics is a “science of patterns” (Devlin, 1997; Resnik, 1997). Given the use of the
word ‘pattern’ in the present research, one might think that these two books
give an account of mathematics that is closely related to the ICMAUS concepts.
However, the word ‘pattern’ in the present work is merely a generic name for
an array of atomic symbols in one or more dimensions whereas in Devlin (1997)
and Resnik (1997), the word ‘pattern’ has more abstract meanings.
That said, Devlin’s book—which is intended as a ‘popular’ presentation of
mathematics rather than an academic treatise—gives a hint of a connection with
the present work because the term ‘pattern’ is used in a way that seems to be
roughly equivalent to ‘regularity’ and there is a connection between regularities
and IC. Resnik uses the term ‘pattern’ to mean the same as the abstract concept
of ‘structure’ as it has been developed in the structuralist view of mathematics
(see also Shapiro, 2000). As with Devlin’s book, there is a hint of a connection
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with the present work because of an apparent link between structuralist concepts
and the intuitive concept of structure which itself seems to reflect redundancy.
Despite these possible links with the present work, neither of the books cited
develops any connection with established concepts of information, redundancy
or IC and there is no mention of any concept of multiple alignment. Read-
ers may wish to view the present proposals as an extension or development of
structuralism. Alternatively, the proposals may be seen as an application of an
independent intellectual tradition—information theory—to concepts in mathe-
matics and logic, with some points of similarity with structuralism.
2.3.2 IC in the Workings of Brains and Nervous Systems
Parsimony has been recognised as an important principle in thinking, science
and the workings of brains and nervous systems from at least as far back as
the fourteenth century when William of Occam suggested that, in thinking and
theorising, “entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”. Other thinking
in this area includes:
• Ernst Mach and others in the nineteenth century wrote on this theme
and, in a similar vein, Zipf (1949) published Human Behaviour and the
Principle of Least Effort.
• The advent of Hartley-Shannon information theory (ca. 1949) led to a
surge of interest in ‘cognitive economy’ and economical encoding in brains
and nervous systems (see, for example, Attneave, 1954; Oldfield, 1954;
Garner, 1974; von Be´ke´sy, 1967). H. B. Barlow has published extensively
on neurophysiology over many years with IC as a recurring theme (see,
for example, Barlow, 1959, 1969, 1997, 2001).
• The idea that pattern recognition may be understood in terms of IC has
been recognised for some time (see, for example, Watanabe, 1972).
• In an extensive programme of research by the author, modelling first-
language learning by children, MLE principles (see Section 2.3.3, below)
emerged as a unifying theme (see Wolff (1988, 1982) and earlier publica-
tions cited there).
• In everyday life, we understand our world to be populated by discrete,
persistent ‘objects’, including discrete entities like words. Whatever else
they may be, these entities seem to have the role of information ‘chunks’
and, as such, they are a powerful aid to economy in our encoding of the
world (Section 2.2.5, above). Relevant discussion may be found in Wolff
(1993, 1988, 1982) and earlier publications cited there.
• Many pointers to more recent work relating IC to the workings of brains
and nervous systems may be found in Chater (1999, 1996).
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If it is accepted that IC does indeed have a fundamental role in the way
brains and nervous systems operate, it is reasonable to ask what advantage this
may have in natural selection.
The most obvious answer is that, given finite resources in brains and nervous
systems, compression of information enables us to achieve more than would oth-
erwise be the case—or use fewer resources for a given level of performance. This
would apply to the storage of information and also to the internal transmission
of information and the input and output of information.
Although these things are probably important, it seems likely that there is
a second reason that is at least as important. This is that there is an intimate
connection between IC and inductive prediction of the future from the past
(described briefly in the next subsection). For any creature, an ability to learn
from experience and anticipate positive or negative events in the future must
be indispensable for survival.
2.3.3 Inductive Inference, Minimum Length Encoding and Proba-
bilistic Reasoning
Largely independent of the research just described, there has been another pro-
gramme of research elucidating the theoretical significance of IC in the abstract
problem of inductive inference: probabilistic prediction of future events from
patterns of events in the past. This programme of research on ‘Minimum Length
Encoding’ (MLE) was pioneered by Solomonoff, Wallace and Boulton, and Ris-
sanen amongst others (see Li and Vita´nyi, 1997).
The connection between IC and inductive inference—which may at first sight
seem obscure—lies in the identification of recurrent patterns. As we have seen
(Section 2.2.3), IC may be achieved by the unification of recurrent patterns.
And a repeating pattern like ‘Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter’ informs out
expectations that Summer will follow Spring, Autumn will follow Summer, and
so on.
The key idea in MLE is that, in grammar induction and related kinds of
processing, one should seek to minimise (G+E), where G is the size (in bits) of
the ‘grammar’ (or comparable structure) under development and E is the size
(in bits) of the raw data when it has been encoded in terms of the grammar.
This principle achieves a compromise between grammars that are very small
but inefficient for coding and grammars that can encode data economically but
are unduly large (Solomonoff, 1986).7
7In the SP61 model (that provides all the examples of multiple alignment shown in this
article), G has a fixed size. This means that it is only necessary to seek to minimise E. In
the SP70 model, currently under development, G and E can both vary so both of them must
be evaluated in the search for minimum length encoding.
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2.4 THE ICMAUS FRAMEWORK AND THE SP61
MODEL
The ICMAUS framework is founded on MLE principles, just described. The
framework is intended as an abstract model of any natural or artificial system
for ‘computing’ or ‘cognition’. It is envisaged that any such system may be
seen to receive ‘raw’ (or ‘New’) data from the environment and to compress
it as much as possible by matching it against itself and against already-stored
patterns (designated ‘Old’), unifying those parts that match (thus achieving the
effect of ‘recognition’) and storing the parts that do not match (which seems to
be a key to ‘learning’).
This framework is partially-realised in a software model, SP61, described
quite fully in Wolff (2000). SP61 performs the recognition part of the ICMAUS
process but does not attempt learning. Work is currently in progress to extend
the model to unsupervised inductive learning. Notwithstanding this limitation
of the current model, it is good enough to provide illustrations for many of the
examples described below.
Currently, all kinds of information for the SP61 model are expressed as one-
dimensional patterns of atomic symbols (examples will be seen below). It is
envisaged that, at some stage, the model will be generalised to patterns in two
or more dimensions.
At the core of the ICMAUS framework (and the SP61 model) is a process for
finding full matches between patterns or good partial matches. It is a refined ver-
sion of ‘dynamic programming’ (see, for example, Sankoff and Kruskall, 1983)
with advantages compared with standard methods: it can process patterns of
arbitrary length, it can find several alternative alignments for any given set of
patterns, and the thoroughness of searching can be controlled by parameters.
The matching process is applied recursively so that the system can build up
‘multiple alignments’, with two or more levels, as will be seen below.
Notwithstanding astronomically large search spaces for most multiple align-
ments, the heuristic techniques used in the SP61 model mean that its computa-
tional complexity (time complexity and space complexity) is within acceptable
polynomial limits.
To date, application of the ICMAUS framework and the SP61 model include:
natural language processing Wolff (2000); modelling a Post Canonical System
(and hence a Universal Turing Machine) Wolff (1999a); and probabilistic and
human-like reasoning Wolff (1999b, 2001).
2.5 EXAMPLE
As a typical example of the kind of alignment formed by SP61, Figure 1 shows
how the sentence ‘j o h n r u n s’ (supplied to the model as ‘New’) may be
aligned with patterns (stored in ‘Old’) that represent grammatical rules. The
overall effect of this alignment is an analysis or parsing of the sentence into its
constituent parts.
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0 j o h n r u n s 0
| | | | | | | |
1 N 0 j o h n #N | | | | 1
| | | | | |
2 S N #N V | | | | #V #S 2
| | | | | |
3 V 1 r u n s #V 3
Figure 1: Parsing of the sentence ‘j o h n r u n s’ as an alignment amongst patterns
representing the sentence and relevant rules in a grammar.
In this and other alignments shown below, New is placed at the top of each
alignment with patterns from Old below it. Each appearance of a pattern in
any alignment is given a line to itself and, below the top line, the order in which
patterns appear (from top to bottom of the alignment) is entirely arbitrary.
A good alignment is defined here as one that provides a basis for an eco-
nomical coding of New in terms of the patterns in Old. There is no space here
to describe the method of evaluation which is used in SP61. A full description
may be found in Wolff (1999b).
2.6 PARSING IN MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC
To bring us a little closer to mathematics and logic, this subsection presents
an example showing how expressions in logic and mathematics may be parsed.
This, in itself, is not a process of mathematical or logical inference such as ad-
dition or multiplication but it is necessary for the interpretation of ML symbols
prior to the application of such processes. The example provides a bridge from
the ‘linguistic’ example shown above to other examples presented later showing
how mathematical and logical structures and processes may be understood in
terms of ICMAUS.
Both mathematics and logic make frequent use of ‘expressions’ that need
to be analysed into their constituent parts before they can be evaluated. An
example from arithmetic is (((6 + 4)(16 − 4)) − 6). In logic one might write a
composite proposition like ∼ ((p∧ q)⇒ ((x∧y)∨ (s∧p))), where the letters are
simple ‘atomic propositions’ like “Today is Tuesday” or an equivalent ‘atomic
formula’ like ‘today(Tuesday)’ and the other symbols have their standard mean-
ings in logic (see the key to Figure 2). Any such analysis is essentially a form
of parsing in the same sense as was used in Section 2.5. And, like ‘linguistic’
kinds of parsing, it requires an appropriate grammar.
It may be objected that the examples are already parsed because they con-
tain the kinds of brackets that may be used to represent the structure of a
sequence of symbols. The reason that parsing is needed in examples like these
is that, until the constituent parts of a sequence are recognised by the sys-
tem, the sequence is merely a stream of symbols and the role of the brackets
in marking structures has not yet been recognised. Brackets are, in any case,
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not a necessary part of the examples—they might equally well be presented in
Polish notation without the use of brackets.
Figure 2 shows part of a grammar for expressions in symbolic logic. Readers
will see that it contains three main rules (beginning with ‘F’). The first one
creates an ‘atomic formula’ like ‘today(Tuesday)’. In a fuller grammar there
would be rules for the creation of a variety of such atomic formulae. The second
rule is a recursive rule covering cases like ‘proposition implies proposition’, where
‘proposition’ can be simple or complex. The third rule is also recursive, covering
all forms of ‘not proposition’. The patterns beginning with ‘R’ show some of
the symbols that may be put between two propositions in the second rule in the
grammar.
F → a
F → ( F R F )
F → ( ∼ F )
R → ⇒
R → ∧
R → ∨
etc
Figure 2: Part of a grammar for symbolic logic. Key: ‘a’ = ‘atomic formula’, ‘∼’ =
‘not’, ‘∧’ = ‘and’, ‘∨’ = ‘or’, ‘⇒’ = ‘implies’.
Figure 3 shows the same grammar as the one in Figure 2 but it is recast
into a form that is appropriate for ICMAUS. The main differences are that
the grammar in ICMAUS style leaves out the rewrite arrow, it uses numbers
to differentiate the three ‘F’ rules and the three ‘R’ rules, and it puts in a
‘terminating’ symbol for each rule and each ‘call’ to a rule. Each ‘terminating’
symbol is formed by copying the initial symbol and adding ‘#’ to the front of
it.
F 1 a #F
F 2 ( F #F R #R F #F ) #F
F 3 ( ∼ F #F ) #F
R 1 ⇒ #R
R 2 ∧ #R
R 3 ∨ #R
Figure 3: The grammar shown in Figure 2 recast in ‘ICMAUS’ style.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the best alignment that was found by SP61 with the
pattern ‘( ( ∼ ( a ⇒ a) ) ∧ a )’ in New and the patterns from Figure 3 in Old.
The alignment may be interpreted as a parsing of the logical expression in terms
of the given grammar and, as such, appears to be ‘correct’.
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0 ( ( ~ ( a => a ) ) ^ a ) 0
| | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | F 3 ( ~ F | | | | | #F ) #F | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
2 F 2 ( F | | | | | | | #F R | #R F | #F ) #F 2
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
3 F 2 ( F | #F R | #R F | #F ) #F | | | | | | 3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
4 F 1 a #F | | | | | | | | | | | | 4
| | | | | | | | | | | |
5 R 1 => #R | | | | | | | | | 5
| | | | | | | | |
6 F 1 a #F | | | | | | 6
| | | | | |
7 | | | F 1 a #F 7
| | |
8 R 2 ^ #R 8
Figure 4: The best alignment found by SP61 with the expression ‘( ( ∼ ( a ⇒ a) ) ∧
a )’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 3 in Old.
2.7 REALISATION OF THE THREE COMPRESSION
TECHNIQUES IN ICMAUS
The two examples of multiple alignment that we have seen so far give us a
preliminary view of the way in which the three compression techniques described
in Section 2.2.5 may be modelled in ICMAUS.
2.7.1 Chunking-with-Codes
In our first example (Figure 1), a pattern like ‘N 0 j o h n #N’ may be seen as
a chunk of information (‘j o h n’) together with its ‘code’ (‘N 0 #N’). In this
case, the code has a dual function of providing a unique identifier for the chunk
and marking the beginning and end of the chunk.
Superficially, the code in this example appears to be only slightly smaller
than the chunk and there does not seem to be much advantage in terms of IC
in recognising the chunk. If ‘j o h n’ had been replaced by ‘j i m’, there would
appear to be no compression at all. But it must be born in mind that each
symbol has its own code and calculations of IC are based on symbol sizes in bits
not simple counts of numbers of symbols.
What about patterns like ‘R 1 ⇒ #R’ in our second example where, even
allowing for varying sizes of symbol codes, it looks as if the code (‘R 1 #R’) is
larger than what it encodes (‘⇒’)? This is discussed in Section 2.7.2, next.
2.7.2 Schema-Plus-Correction
In our first example (Figure 1), it should be clear that a pattern like ‘S N #N V
#V #S’ is taking the role of a schema that may be corrected or completed by
the addition of a noun pattern and a verb pattern. Although sentence patterns
in a language like English are relatively abstract concepts, they are patterns
that repeat very often in the language and thus represent, in compressed form,
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relatively large amounts of redundancy. In a similar way, patterns like ‘F 2 (
F #F R #R F #F ) #F’ and ‘F 3 ( ∼ F #F ) #F’ represent very frequently
recurring patterns in the language of logic (‘F ⇒ ( F R F )’ and ‘F ⇒ ( ∼ F )’
respectively) and thus capture a significant amount of the redundancy in that
language.
An answer to the question raised at the end of the last subsection is that,
when IC is achieved using schemata like ‘F 2 ( F #F R #R F #F ) #F’ and
‘F 3 ( ∼ F #F ) #F’, it is also necessary to create patterns like ‘R 1 ⇒ #R’
that are corrections or completions of the schemata. Such ‘correction’ patterns
may not, in themselves, represent any redundancy but they contribute to IC
via their role in conjunction with patterns that function as schemata (see also
Section 3.3.1).
2.7.3 Run-Length Coding
In ICMAUS, there is no explicit mechanism for representing iterated structures
as there is in computer programming (e.g., the while loop, the for loop, or the
repeat ... until loop). The sole mechanism is recursion (in the sense of computer
programming) as can be seen in the examples in Sections 4.2 and 2.6.
The ICMAUS grammar in Figure 3 exhibits this kind of recursion (in the
second and third lines). Another example is described in Section 4.2.
2.8 MATHEMATICS, LOGIC, INFORMATION, RE-
DUNDANCY AND STRUCTURE
Before we proceed to the two main sections of this article, it may be useful to
take a ‘global’ view of ML in terms of concepts that have been introduced in
this section.
The concept of ‘information’, as described above, is a highly abstract concept
with a very wide scope. Anything and everything of which we may conceive,
including mathematics, logic, brains, computers, trees, houses, and so on, may
be seen as information. We cannot learn about the world without absorbing
information and any inborn knowledge that we may have may also be seen as
information.
Information that is totally random—without any detectable redundancy—is
totally lacking in structure. All persistent entities, concepts, laws, theorems
or regularities, including the concepts of mathematics and logic, represent re-
dundancy or structure in information. Any kind of repeatable calculation or
deduction is a manifestation of redundancy in the substance of mathematics
and logic. And information compression is the mechanism by which we detect
and manipulate these redundancies.
In short, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that concepts in ML
are intimately related at a fundamental level to concepts of information, redun-
dancy, structure and the compression of information.
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2.9 THE ICMAUS FRAMEWORK AND AIT
AIT (described briefly in Section 2.2.2, above) is closely related to MLE prin-
ciples. Since the ICMAUS framework is founded on MLE principles, one might
ask what distinguishes the ICMAUS proposals from AIT. The key differences
are these:
• Within AIT, the Turing model of ‘computing’ is taken as ‘given’, whereas,
within the ICMAUS theory, it may be seen as a special case of the IC-
MAUS framework (Wolff, 1999a).
• The concept of multiple alignment, as it has been developed within the
ICMAUS theory, has no counterpart within AIT.
• The ICMAUS framework provides a perspective on a range of AI issues
and on the nature of mathematics and logic which is quite different from
anything in AIT.
3 ML Structures and information compression
The previous sections of this article have prepared the ground for what is really
the main substance of the article:
• This section describes the idea that ML notation and ML structures may
be seen as a set of devices for representing information in a compressed
form.
• The next section presents the idea that processes of mathematical and
logical inference may also be understood in terms of IC.
As was noted earlier, the arguments and examples to be presented are not
intended as any kind of proof of the proposition that ML is based on IC. They
are merely suggestive indications of what may turn out to be a fruitful way to
view mathematics, logic and related disciplines—an avenue to new insights and
understanding.
Within this main section, Section 3.1 considers some general features of ML
that suggest that there is a close connection between ML and IC. Next, we
consider some aspects of number systems that seem to relate to IC. Then in
Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we consider how the IC principles of chunking-with-
codes, schema-plus-correction and run-length coding may be seen to operate in
ML forms and structures. Section 3.5 considers some of the ways in which these
concepts may be modelled in ICMAUS.
3.1 SUGGESTIVE EVIDENCE
Considering, first, the idea that ML notations and structures might be seen
as devices for representing information in a compressed form, a general indi-
cation that something like this might be true is provided by three aspects of
mathematics discussed in the next three subsections.
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3.1.1 Mathematics as the “Language of Science”
In the context of science as a search for succinct descriptions of the world, it
is often remarked that mathematics provides a remarkably and ‘mysteriously’
convenient way to express scientific truths. Thus Penrose (1989), who takes a
Platonic view of mathematics, writes:
It is remarkable that all the SUPERB theories of Nature have proved
to be extraordinarily fertile as sources of mathematical ideas. There
is a deep and beautiful mystery in this fact: that these superbly accu-
rate theories are also extraordinarily fruitful simply as mathemat-
ics. (pp. 225–226, emphasis as in the original).
In a similar vein, Barrow (1992) writes:
For some mysterious reason mathematics has proved itself a reli-
able guide to the world in which we live and of which we are a part.
Mathematics works: as a result we have been tempted to equate un-
derstanding of the world with its mathematical encapsulization. ...
Why is the world found to be so unerringly mathematical? (Preface,
p. vii).
This last question is partly answered later:
Science is, at root, just the search for compression in the world. ...
In short, the world is surprisingly compressible and the success of
mathematics in describing its workings is a manifestation of that
compressibility. (ibid., p. 247).
Thus he recognises that mathematics provides a good medium for expressing
scientific observations in a compressed form but he stops short of making the
connection, which is the subject of this article, between mathematical concepts
and standard concepts of information and IC.
3.1.2 The Nature of Mathematical ‘Functions’
A mathematical ‘function’ is a mapping from one set (X) to another set (Y ) and,
in the ‘strict’ form of a function, each element of X is mapped to at most one
element of Y (Sudkamp, 1988, p. 7) although it is sometimes useful to consider
more ‘relaxed’ kinds of ‘function’ where each element of X may be mapped
to more than one element of Y . In essence, a function is a table with one or
more columns representing the ‘input’ and one or more columns representing
the ‘output’. Thus an element of set X may be one or more cells from one row
of the table and the corresponding element of set Y is the complementary set
of one or more cells from the same row of the table.
Very simple functions, such as the exclusive-OR function, can be and often
are represented literally as a table. This and other examples will be considered
later. But, in the vast majority of cases, the definition of a function (the ‘body’
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of the function in computer-science jargon) does not look anything like a table.
Nevertheless, whatever the definition of a function might look like, all functions
behave as if they were ‘look up’ tables that yield an output value or set of values
in response to an appropriate input.
The key point here is that, with regard to the more complex kinds of func-
tions that do not look like a table, they are almost invariably smaller than the
abstract table they represent and, in most cases, they are smaller by a large
factor.
This feature of the more complex kinds of functions means that they can
provide a very effective means of compressing information. Consider, for ex-
ample, a function relating the distance travelled by an object to the time since
the object was dropped from a high place and allowed to fall freely under the
influence of gravity (ignoring the effect of resistance from air). If the function is
represented as a table and if there is an entry in the table for each microsecond
or nanosecond, then for a fall of 100 metres, say, the table will be very large. By
comparison, Newton’s formula, s = (gt2)/2 (where s is the distance travelled, g
is the acceleration due to gravity and t is the time since the object was allowed
to fall), is extremely compact.
This feature of the more complex kinds of function goes a long way to ex-
plaining why mathematics is such an effective “language of science”. However,
as we shall see, there is more to be said than this about IC and the nature of
functions.
3.1.3 The Nature of Counting
Given its close association with the number system, the process of counting
things is clearly central in mathematics.
A little reflection shows that it is not possible to count things without some
kind of process of recognition. If we are asked to count the number of apples
in a bowl of fruit, we need to be able to recognise each apple and distinguish
it from other fruits in the bowl—oranges, bananas and so on. Even if we are
asked to count the number of ‘things’ in some location, we need to recognise
each one as a ‘thing’ and distinguish it from the environment in which it lies.
Recognition is a complex process which can be applied at various levels of
abstraction. But notwithstanding this complexity it seems clear that it neces-
sarily involves a process of matching patterns. And, as we noted in Section 2.2.4,
if the things to be counted are all to be assimilated to a single concept (e.g.,
‘apple’ or ‘thing’ or other category), this implies the unification of matching
patterns.
Given the connection between IC and the matching and unification of pat-
terns (described in Section 2.2.4), it seems that counting involves a process of
compressing information. Given the central importance of counting in math-
ematics, this is one strand of evidence pointing to the importance of IC in
mathematics.
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3.2 CHUNKING-WITH-CODES
As we saw earlier (Section 2.2.5), the idea of giving a name, ‘identifier’, ‘tag’
or ‘code’ to a relatively large chunk of information is a means of compressing
information that we use so often and that comes so naturally that we scarcely
realise that we are compressing information.
In ML, as in many other areas, names are widespread. We use names for
mathematical and logical functions, for sets and members of sets, for numbers,
for variables, for matrices and for geometric forms. In computer programming,
names are used for functions and subroutines, for methods, classes and ob-
jects (in object-oriented design (OOD)), for arrays and variables, for tables and
columns (in databases) and, in the bad old days of spaghetti programming,
names were used copiously for individual statements or lines where the program
could ‘go to’.
In almost every case, it seems that a name has the role of being a relatively
short code representing a relatively large chunk of information. As such, most
or all of these names contribute to the achievement of IC.
In the following subsections we shall consider these ideas in a little more
detail.
3.2.1 The Concept of a Discrete Object in ML
Historically, it seems likely that the concept of number originated with the need
to keep a tally on concrete objects like sheep, goats, oranges etc. Arguably,
the earliest number system was the system of unary natural numbers where
1 = 01, 2 = 011, 3 = 0111 etc and other number systems were invented or
discovered later as a generalization of that simple kind of counting.8
Whether or not that historical speculation is accepted, most people will
accept that there is a connection between the concept of natural numbers, es-
pecially unary numbers, and the concept of discrete objects in the world. The
latter do not depend on the former (because animals—and people without any
knowledge of numbers—can recognise discrete objects). But each stroke in a
unary number is itself recognised as a discrete entity and, even if we are using
numbers with bases higher than one, we know that it is often convenient to
make a one-to-one association between strokes in the underlying unary number
and objects in the real world.
In a similar way, the concept of a set, with elements of the set being discrete
entities (some of which may themselves be sets), provides a link with the way
we see the world as composed of discrete objects.
Thus the concept of a discrete object has a significant role in both the
concept of number and of a set. And the concepts of number and set are both
key parts of ML. Bearing in mind that seeing the world in terms of discrete
objects is almost certainly a reflection of the way our perceptions and concepts
are governed by IC principles (Section 2.3.2), it is apparent that IC plays a
significant part in the foundations of ML.
8A concept of zero was, historically, a relatively late development.
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3.2.2 Chunking-with-Codes in Number Systems?
With regard to names or codes as relatively short identifiers for chunks, let us
begin with a type of name which, at first sight, does not appear to have a role
in IC. It can be argued that the names (words or numerals) that we give to
numbers merely serve to differentiate one number from another and are not
codes for relatively large chunks of information. We may argue that this is true
even for names like ‘one billion’ or ‘109’ that represent relatively large numbers
and would take a lot of space if they were written out using unary arithmetic or
even binary arithmetic. The reason we may give is that the base of a number
(unary, binary etc) is irrelevant to the calculation of the amount of information
it represents so that any number in any base is totally equivalent to the same
number in another base in terms of information, apart from errors arising from
any rounding of numbers that we may choose to make.
This line of reasoning is valid for conversions between two numbers both
of which have a base of 2 or more, but it appears to be wrong for conversions
between numbers where one of the two numbers is unary.
Although unary numbers are conventionally considered to have a base of 1,
there is a sense in which they have no base at all. Each stroke in a unary number
seems to be a primitive representation of a discrete entity and the stroke cannot
be analysed into anything simpler.
By contrast, any number that uses a base greater than 1 introduces a new
principle: the idea that groups of symbols may be given a relatively short name
or code, and that this may be done recursively through any number of levels.
In the decimal system, for example, 8 is a relatively short name for the unary
number ‘011111111’. At this point, a sceptic might object that, to accommodate
decimal digits from 0 to 9, each one must be assigned at least ⌈log210⌉ = 4 bits
of space in a computer memory and that this is equivalent to the amount of
information in the corresponding unary number.
In the case of the decimal digits from 0 to 9, this objection may carry some
force. But it appears not to be valid when we consider numbers of 10 or more.
The decimal number 100, for example, uses digits within the range 0 to 9 and
so, on the assumption that we are not needing to represent anything other than
numbers, we could accommodate the three digits in ‘100’ with only 3 × 4 = 12
bits (or, if we started counting from 0 and thus finished counting at 99, we
could accommodate the number with only 2 × 4 = 8 bits). This is very much
less than the number of strokes in the corresponding unary number and thus,
prima facie, seems to be a clear case of IC.
In Section 2.2.4 we saw that lossless compression of I is only possible if we
can detect redundancy in I. Where is the redundancy in unary arithmetic that
might allow us to use the chunking-with-codes technique as suggested above?
The answer seems to lie in the apparent need to provide a symbol (normally ‘0’)
to represent zero in the unary number system.9 If the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’ are
9Apart from the need to represent the concept of zero, a system containing nothing but
unary numbers would need some means of marking the beginnings and ends of numbers. This
can be achieved if every number starts with ‘0’.
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both provided in the unary number system then it is clear that in all the many
unary numbers where the number of ‘1’s is large, the probability of ‘1’ is very
much higher than ‘0’ and so, in accordance with Hartley-Shannon information
theory, these numbers generally contain considerable amounts of redundancy.
Thus the conversion of any unary number (except very small ones) into the
equivalent number using a base of 2 or more seems to be a genuine example of
chunking-with-codes and seems to achieve genuine IC.
3.2.3 Grammars and Re-Write Rules
CF-PSGs comprising rewrite rules like ‘S → NP VP’ are used in theoreti-
cal linguistics although, since Chomsky’s monograph on Syntactic Structures
(Chomsky, 1957), it is well known that such grammars are not adequate to
handle the full complexity of natural languages. Essentially the same kind of
grammar and rules are known as Bachus-Naur form (BNF) and are used widely
in computer science, especially in specifying the syntax of programming lan-
guages. Again, the same kind of grammar and rewrite rules are used in studies
of logic (see, for example, Mandelbrot, 1993).
In many examples of rewrite rules, but not all, there are fewer symbols to
the left of the rewrite arrow than there are on the right. Very often, there is
only one symbol before the rewrite arrow and several to the right.
In cases like these, it seems reasonable to interpret the symbol or symbols
to the left of the rewrite arrow as a relatively short code for the symbols to the
right of the arrow. And in most cases, it is clear that these codes do indeed
have a role in IC: a grammar is, in effect, a compressed representation of the
natural or artificial language that it generates.
In general, a grammar represents lossy compression of any one sample of the
language. This is because, in most cases, a grammar does not encode specific
sentences or computer programs. Nevertheless, the rules of a grammar nor-
mally correspond to repeating patterns found in samples of the language and
thus represent a distillation of some at least of the redundancy to be found in
the language. The patterns that repeat in a sample of language can be rela-
tively concrete patterns such as words, or they can be more abstract patterns
at ‘higher’ levels, like phrases, clauses and sentences.
3.2.4 Named Functions and Operators
In the course of writing a computer program, it often happens that the program-
mer encounters sections of the program in two or more different places within
the program that are the same as each other or very similar. In cases like this,
it is normal practice to reduce the several sections to a single function, to give
the function a name and then to use that name as a ‘call’ to the function in
each of the places where one of the original sections was found. This kind of
procedure provides us with an illustration of the chunking-with-codes technique
and its use in the service of IC. It is so convenient to be able to reuse functions
like ‘date’ or ‘time’ under Unix by just giving their names, and it would be so
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tedious if we had to write out in full the program statements for these functions
every time we wanted to use them.
Of course, a named function can itself contain one or more named func-
tions and this gives rise to the familiar hierarchies of function calls in computer
programs and other areas of ML.
Notions of ‘method’ (in OOD) or ‘subroutine’ provide similar examples. An
‘operator’ like ‘+’ or ‘×’ is essentially the same except that it is normally sup-
plied by the programming system (although systems like Prolog allow users to
define their own operators).
Very often, two or more sections of a program are the same except that dif-
ferent numbers or data structures are processed. In this case, a named function
can be formed but the variable part is supplied as an ‘argument’ to the function,
e.g., ‘4’ in ‘square root(4)’. More will be said below about this kind of function.
In practice, things are not quite as simple as just described. In conventional
computers, there is a run-time ‘overhead’ arising from the creation of a named
function and, if run-time considerations are pressing, a programmer may delib-
erately choose to leave repeating sections as they are. In other situations, it
can be convenient for reasons of readability or layout of the program to create
a named function even though there is only one instance of the relevant section
of the program. Notwithstanding examples like these, it remains true that a
major reason for the use of named functions is to avoid undue redundancy in
computer programs.
Very much the same things can be said about the concept of ‘function’ in
mathematics. Repeated chunks may not always be converted into a named
function and there may be occasions where a named function is recognised even
though it is used only once. But in the great majority of cases, the use of
a named function can be seen to be a way of avoiding undue redundancy in
mathematical text.
Systems like Prolog that are designed for ‘programming in logic’ provide
similar structures. A Horn clause in Prolog with both a ‘head’ and a ‘body’
is very much like a function in procedural programming languages. The head
serves as an identifier or code for the clause and the body is the chunk of
information which is identified. Normally, the body is significantly larger than
the head and, normally, the body is a pattern that would be repeated in two
or more parts of the program if it had not been recast as a named chunk in
the form of a Horn clause. As with functions, there may be ‘arguments’ or
‘parameters’ to allow for variations in the data being processed.
3.3 SCHEMA-PLUS-CORRECTION
This subsection considers some constructs in ML that seem to be examples of
the IC principle of schema-plus-correction.
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3.3.1 Structures Containing Variables
The concept of a ‘variable’ is widespread in mathematics, logic, computer pro-
gramming and theoretical linguistics. In all its uses it is understood as some
kind of ‘receptacle’ that may receive a ‘value’ by ‘assignment’ or by ‘instantia-
tion’. In many systems, each variable has a ‘type’ with a ‘type definition’ that
defines the range of values that the variable may receive.
In the majority of cases, a variable has a name, although unnamed variables
are used sometimes in systems like Prolog. If the size of the value of a named
variable is relatively large compared with the name (and values in Prolog can be
very large, complex structures), then, in some cases, the name may be under-
stood as a ‘code’ and the value may be seen as a corresponding chunk so that
the two together may be seen to make a contribution to IC via the chunking-
with-codes technique. But in many cases, the value and the name are similar
in size or the value is smaller than the name. Surely, in cases like these, or in
cases where the variable has no name, there cannot be any contribution to IC?
The answer to this question seems to be much as was described in Section
2.7.2, above. A structure that contains variables may usually be seen as a
schema, the variables may be seen as ‘holes’ or ‘slots’ in the schema and the
values may be seen as ‘corrections’ or ‘completions’ of the schema. In cases like
these, the schema may often be seen as a unification of two or more patterns
with a corresponding gain in IC. In short, the contribution that variables can
make to IC is not normally a function of the variables in themselves but because
they form part of a larger structure—a schema—that contributes to IC. Some
examples are described in the subsections that follow.
3.3.2 Functions with Arguments or Parameters
As we noted in Section 3.2.4, a function need not be a monolithic chunk of
information: most functions allow for variations in the data to which they will
be applied by providing ‘arguments’ or ‘parameters’ that may take different
values on different invocations of the function.
This kind of function may be seen as a schema with holes or slots (the
arguments or parameters) that may be filled with a variety of ‘corrections’ or
‘completions’ on different occasions. Provided the function is called two or more
times in an ML text, it can be seen as a means of avoiding undue redundancy
in that text.
3.3.3 Classes, Objects and Inheritance of Attributes
In our everyday talking, writing and thinking, we make frequent use of general
classes like ‘person’, ‘house’, ‘furniture’ and so on. Classes may include other
classes, recursively through any number of levels. The class ‘person’ for example,
may include subclasses like ‘man’ or ‘woman’ and it may be included in higher
level classes like ‘living thing’.
Although it is difficult to be sure how our brains actually use these kinds
of concepts, it seems likely that they provide a powerful means for compressing
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information. Certainly, this would be very much in keeping with the variety
of other evidence of economy in the functioning of brains and nervous systems
that we noted earlier (Section 2.3.2).
The trick is to store all the attributes of living things in general in our
memory of the class ‘living thing’, to store all the additional things we know
about people in general in our memory for ‘person’, and likewise for the classes
‘man’ and ‘woman’. Then if we recognise something as a man, we can infer that
he has all the attributes of ‘man’ and of ‘person’ and of ‘living thing’. Without
this device, information about the attributes of ‘man’, ‘person’ and ‘living thing’
would have to be repeated in the mental record for each of the men that we
may know. If, like most people, we know at least a little about each of a large
number of different men, the redundancy would be huge.
Starting with Simula (invented by Dahl, Myhrhaug and Nygaard (see, for
example, Birtwistle et al., 1973)), these ideas have been incorporated in a va-
riety of ‘object-oriented’ programming languages. Using such a language, it
is possible to define classes like those above and, usually for the lowest level
classes, we can create any number of specific objects, each one with its own
specific attributes (e.g., ‘name’, ‘address’, ‘telephone number’ etc for an object
of the class ‘man’). Any one object inherits all the ‘attributes’ of its lowest level
class and, following the hierarchy upwards, it inherits the attributes of all the
higher-level classes of the object. In this programming context, ‘attributes’ are
data structures and ‘methods’ (similar to functions). Each object contains its
own data structures following the patterns defined in the relevant classes but it
can inherit its methods by ‘borrowing’ from the class description as and when
they are needed.
This is not the place to rehearse the many benefits of this style of program-
ming. The key point here is that it makes it easy to design programs with a
minimum of redundancy. In terms of the concept of schema-plus-correction:
• A class at any level is, in effect a schema describing attributes which are
found in every member of the class.
• Any subclass of a given class provides full or partial ‘corrections’ or ‘com-
pletions’ of its parent class.
• The details of any specific object (e.g., the name, address etc of a man)
are, likewise, corrections or completions of the lowest level class in which
the object belongs.
Notwithstanding the ‘power’ of the concepts of classes, objects and inheri-
tance of attributes they seem not to have been taken up in any significant way
in mathematics, logic or theoretical linguistics. That said, there have been some
moves to incorporate OO principles in versions of Prolog and, as we shall see
below, some similarities may be traced between these ideas and others that are
prominent elsewhere in ML.
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3.3.4 Sets
Perhaps the closest relative of the OO concepts just described in mathematics
and logic is the concept of a set.
A set can be defined extensionally—by listing the elements in the set (e.g.,
{sun,wind, rain})—or it may be defined intensionally—by listing the defining
characteristics of the class (e.g., {n|n is prime}). An intensionally-defined set is
similar to a class as described in Section 3.3.3 and, when one set includes one or
more other sets recursively through an arbitrary number of levels, the structure
is similar to a class hierarchy as described above. But, to my knowledge, little
or no attempt has been made to develop concepts like inheritance of attributes
or the instantiation of a class by one or more objects.
With regard to IC, an intensionally defined set that describes two or more
elements may be regarded as a compressed representation of the relevant at-
tributes of those elements.
3.3.5 Propositions in Logic with the Universal Quantifier
Here are two examples of propositions expressed in English and in logical nota-
tion:
• “All humans are mortal.”
∀x : human(x)⇒ mortal(x).
• “For any integer which is a member of the set of natural numbers (N)
and which is even, it is also true that the given integer with 1 added is
odd.”
∀i ǫ N · is even(i)⇒ is odd(i + 1).
Each example is a proposition containing a universal quantifier and a variable
(all three instances of x refer to a single variable and likewise for i). The first
statement is a generalization about what it is to be human and the second one
is a generalization about natural numbers. Both of them represent repeating
(redundant) patterns. Each may be regarded as a schema rather than a chunk
because, notwithstanding its status as ‘bound’, the variable in each example can
receive a variety of values.
3.4 RUN-LENGTH CODING
When something repeats in a series of instances, each one contiguous with the
next, we find it very natural to find some way to reduce the repetition to a single
instance with something to mark the repetition. As noted previously, lossless
compression is achieved if the number of repetitions is marked; otherwise the
IC is lossy.
This section identifies some examples of run-length coding and further ex-
amples will be described in Section 4.
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3.4.1 Iteration and Recursion in Computer Programming
In computer programming, repetition of a part of a program can be shown
using forms like a while loop or a for loop or a repeat ... until loop. Generally
speaking, there is some change in the value of one or more variables on each
iteration of the block of program. So this kind of repetition may be regarded as
a combination of run-length coding and schema-plus-correction.
As we have seen earlier (Section 2.2.5), repetition can also be expressed
with recursion (in the sense understood in computer programming). Here is an
example (in the C programming language) of the factorial function:
int factorial(int x)
{
if (x == 1) return(1) ;
return(x * factorial(x - 1)) ;
}
3.4.2 Repetition in Mathematics
Mathematics uses a variety of ways to show repetition in a succinct manner:
• Multiplication is a shorthand for repeated addition.
• The power notation (e.g., 109) is a shorthand for repeated multiplication.
• A factorial (e.g., 10!) is a shorthand for repeated multiplication and sub-
traction.
• The bounded summation notation (‘
∑
’) and the bounded power notation
(‘
∏
’) are shorthands for repeated addition and repeated multiplication,
respectively. In both cases, there is normally a change in the value of a
variable on each iteration, so these devices may be seen as a combination
of run-length coding and schema-plus-correction.
• As in our previous examples, repetition of a function may be achieved by
a direct or indirect ‘recursive’ call to the function.
As we noted previously (Section 2.2.5), the use of shorthands is so automatic
and ‘natural’ that it is easy to overlook the fact that they are examples of
information compression.
3.5 MODELLING THESE CONCEPTS IN ICMAUS
If it is accepted that our three basic techniques for IC can be modelled in
ICMAUS (as outlined in Section 2.7) and if it is accepted that many forms
and structures in ML may be understood in terms of IC (as described in the
preceding parts of this main section), then one might expect that many of the
forms and structures of ML could be modelled in ICMAUS. The majority of
examples will be seen in Section 4. As a preparation for these later examples,
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this subsection focuses on some basic structures in ML and how they may be
modelled in ICMAUS.
3.5.1 Variable, Value and Type Definition
The basic idea of a named variable can be represented quite simply in ICMAUS
by a pair of symbols that are contiguous within a pattern. In principle, any
pair of symbols may be seen to function as a variable but in most examples we
shall be considering the left and right symbols will correspond to the initial and
terminal symbols of patterns. Thus, in Figure 1, each of the pairs of symbols
‘N #N’ and ‘V #V’ in the pattern ‘S N #N V #V #S’ may be seen to function
as variables with the first symbol of each pair acting as a name for the variable
and the second serving to mark the end of whatever ‘value’ goes between the
two symbols. These ‘values’ are patterns representing a noun in the case of ‘N
#N’ and a verb between the symbols ‘V’ and ‘#V’. In a similar way in Figure
4, each of the pairs of symbols ‘F #F’ and ‘R #R’ in the pattern ‘F 2 ( F #F
R #R F #F ) #F’ function as a variable that can take other patterns in the
grammar as values.
In these examples, each variable may be seen to have a ‘type definition’ in
the form of the set of patterns that has initial and terminal symbols that match
the left and right symbols of the variable. For the variable ‘N #N’, the type
definition is the two ‘noun’ patterns that can fit in that slot and for the variable
‘V #V’ the type definition is the two patterns for verbs. Of course, in a realistic
system, those two types would have many more members.
Although the examples shown seem to capture the essentials of the concepts
of ‘variable’, ‘value’ and ‘type definition’, they lack two of the features that are
commonly found in computer systems:
• Scoping: In most computer systems, a variable can have a ‘scope’ meaning
a part of a program within which repeated instances of a variable name
refer to a single variable.
• Assignment of a type to a variable: In many computer systems, any vari-
able can be assigned a type that is independent of its name. This contrasts
with the examples given above where the name of the variable is also the
name of its type definition.
It seems likely that these two ideas can be modelled in ICMAUS but not in
the SP61 model in its current state of development. Discussion of how these
things might be done in ICMAUS in the future would take us too far afield for
this article.
3.5.2 Objects, Classes and Inheritance of Attributes
Although notions of objects, classes and inheritance of attributes seem not to
have been adopted in ‘mainstream’ mathematics or logic, they have become
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prominent in OOD. The example presented here is intended to show the essen-
tials of how these concepts can be accommodated in ICMAUS. As elsewhere in
this article, a simple example has been chosen for the sake of clarity and to save
space but readers should not infer that it represents the limits of what the SP61
model can do. The scaling properties of the model are good (see Wolff, 1999b)
and more complicated examples are well within its reach.
Figure 5 shows a set of patterns that represent, in highly simplified form,
part of the taxonomic hierarchy of animals recognised by zoologists. The seventh
pattern, for example, represents the class ‘bat’ and describes its attributes briefly
as ‘flies echo sounder’. Of course, in a realistic example, this description of the
attributes of a bat would be much fuller.
After the symbol ‘bat’ in the pattern for the class ‘bat’ is the name of the
class (‘mammal’) that is immediately above ‘bat’ in the taxonomy of animals.
References like this from one class to another means that the patterns capture
the (simplified) taxonomic hierarchy, from ‘vertebrate’ and ‘invertebrate’ at the
most abstract level down to ‘Fido’ and ‘Tibbs’ at the most concrete level.
vertebrate backbone #v
invertebrate no backbone #iv
mammal vertebrate #v furry warm blood milk #m
bird vertebrate #v feathers wings #bd
cat mammal #m retractile claws #c
dog mammal #m barks #d
bat mammal #m flies echo sounder #bt
inst Fido dog #d #i
inst Tibbs cat #ct #i
Figure 5: A set of patterns representing part of the taxonomy of animals in highly
simplified form. Frequencies of occurrence are assigned to the patterns in accordance
with what one would naturally find: ‘animals’ are more frequent than ‘vertebrates’
which are more frequent than ‘mammals’, which are more frequent than ‘dogs’.
Figure 6 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘Fido
backbone’ in New (describing something called ‘Fido’ that has a backbone) and
the patterns from Figure 5 in Old. In effect, the alignment has shown that Fido
belongs in the class ‘dog’, that this is a ‘mammal’ and that the class ‘mammal’
belongs in the class ‘vertebrate’. All the attributes of each class are brought
into the alignment and, together, they provide a relatively full description of
the attributes of Fido. This is the essence of the concept of ‘inheritance of
attributes’.
4 ML processes and information compression
The previous section presented a range of examples showing that many notations
and forms in ML may be seen as devices for representation of ML concepts in a
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0 Fido backbone 0
| |
1 inst Fido dog | #d #i 1
| | |
2 dog mammal | #m barks #d 2
| | |
3 | vertebrate backbone #v | 3
| | | |
4 mammal vertebrate #v furry warm_blood milk #m 4
Figure 6: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘Fido backbone’ in New and the
patterns from Figure 5 in Old.
succinct form. This section presents a range of examples in support of the idea
that, very often, the computational or inferential processes in ML may also be
understood in terms of IC. More specifically, it is suggested that, very often,
they may be understood in terms of ICMAUS.
As previously noted, an argument has already been presented (Wolff, 1999a)
that the concept of ‘computing’, as defined by the structure and functioning
of the UTM and PCS models, may be understood in terms of ICMAUS. The
arguments and examples here may be seen as a development of the theme with
other examples in mathematics, logic and related disciplines.
4.1 SETS
This subsection considers briefly how some of the basic features of sets may be
understood in terms of the alignment and unification of patterns.
4.1.1 Creating a Set from a Bag or Multiset
The concept of ‘New’ as it has been described in this article allows two or more
patterns within New to be identical and, in that respect, New is like a ‘bag’ or
‘multiset’ in logic.
If New were to contain a range of one-symbol patterns like this:
{(A)(B)(C)(D)(A)(D)(B)(A)(C)(C)(A)(C)} (or if New were to contain multi-
symbol patterns that repeated exactly in a similar way) it is not hard to see
how, with Old initially empty, the alignment and unification of patterns in a
learning process like that outlined in Section 2.4 would reduce New to a set of
patterns in Old like this: {(A)(B)(C)(D)}.
Thus, the process of converting a bag into the corresponding set containing
a single example of each type of element in the bag may be seen as a process of
information compression by the alignment and unification of patterns.
4.1.2 Union and Intersection of Sets
If the set {(B)(C)(D)(F)(G)} were in New and the set {(A)(B)(C)(E)(F)} were
the entire contents of Old, it is not hard to see that, in much the same way
as just described, the result would be: {(A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)}. This set is
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the union of the first two sets and their intersection is the one-symbol patterns
show in bold type—the set {(B)(C)(F)}.
In general, we can see that the union and intersection of two sets may be
seen as IC by alignment and unification amongst the elements of the sets.
4.1.3 Intensionally-Defined Sets
An intensionally-defined set such as {x|x > 1} may be regarded as a represen-
tation of a set in compressed form. Unless the set has only a few members (or
is empty), this representation is clearly more economical than the extensional
definition that itemises every element of the set. The process of deriving an in-
tensional definition from the corresponding extensional definition may be seen
as the alignment and unification of the defining attributes in the elements of
the set.
4.2 GENERATION AND RECOGNITION OF NUM-
BERS
The simplest system of numbers, in terms of numbers of symbol types, is the
unary system mentioned earlier. This kind of system can be defined using a
PCS (Post, 1943), like this:
• Alphabet: 0, 1.
• Axiom: 0.
• Production: If any string ‘$’ is a number, then so is the string ‘$ 1’. This
can be expressed with the production: $→ $ 1
Here, the production is a rewrite rule of the kind discussed earlier and ‘$’
represents a variable. With this ‘successor function’, it should be clear that, if
the variable is initialised with the value of the axiom (0), then the system will
generate, recursively, the infinite set of unary natural numbers, 01, 011, 0111 etc.
Slightly less clear is the fact that the system may be run ‘backwards’ so that
it can recognise any unary number as a unary number and thus distinguish it
from all other strings which are not unary numbers.
The axiom and production can be modelled with ICMAUS-style patterns
shown in Figure 7. In these patterns, the symbols ‘a’ and ‘b’ are needed for
the scoring system used in SP61 and may be ignored. Notice that symbol ‘$’ in
Figure 7 is not a variable. It is an atomic symbol with exactly the same status
as the other symbols in the figure. In functional terms (as described in Section
3.5.1, above), the ‘variable’ in Figure 7 is the pair of symbols ‘$ #$’.
The recursive nature of the production shown above is represented in Figure
7 in the last pattern shown in Old by the fact that the initial and terminal
symbols of the pattern match the two symbols ‘$ #$’ which, together, constitute
the ‘variable’ in the body of the pattern. This pattern may be read as “A unary
number is any unary number (in the ‘variable’ in the body of the pattern)
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followed by ‘1”’. There is no need for the rewrite arrow which appears in the
production, above.
New
0
Old
$ a 0 #$
$ b $ #$ 1 #$
Figure 7: Patterns for processing by SP61 to model a PCS to generate unary numbers.
4.2.1 Generation of Unary Numbers
Figure 8 shows one of many possible ‘good’ alignments between the one-symbol
pattern in New in Figure 7 and the patterns in Old. The symbol ‘0’ in New
aligns with the matching symbol in the ‘axiom’ in Old. And then that pattern
matches the ‘production’ pattern which then matches its initial and terminal
symbols to its ‘variable’ symbols recursively.
0 0 0
|
1 $ a 0 #$ 1
| |
2 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ 2
| |
3 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ 3
| |
4 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ 4
| |
5 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ 5
Figure 8: One of the many good alignments found by SP61 with the one-symbol
pattern ‘0’ in New as shown in Figure 7 and with patterns in Old as shown in that
figure.
All the symbols in the alignment other than the ‘0’ and ‘1’ symbols may be
regarded as ‘service’ symbols and may be ignored. If the alignment is unified
to form a single pattern, it contains the sequence ‘01111’ which is the unary
number for 4. In short, the alignment may be seen as the generation of that
number.10
10Readers may, very reasonably, ask “How is it possible for a relatively large pattern like
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4.2.2 Recognition of a Unary Number
Figure 9 shows the best alignment that is found by SP61 with the pattern
‘01111’ in New and patterns in Old as shown in Figure 7. This alignment may
be interpreted as the recognition of the binary number for 4 in terms of patterns
in Old as shown in Figure 7.
0 0 1 1 1 1 0
| | | | |
1 $ a 0 #$ | | | | 1
| | | | | |
2 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ | | | 2
| | | | |
3 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ | | 3
| | | |
4 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ | 4
| | |
5 $ b $ #$ 1 #$ 5
Figure 9: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘0 1 1 1 1’ in New and patterns in
Old as shown in Figure 7.
4.3 EXECUTION OF SIMPLE FUNCTIONS
The concept of a ‘function’, that we have already considered as an example of
chunking-with-codes (Sections 2.2.5 and 3.2.4) and as a mediator of IC (Section
3.1.2), is one of the most distinctive features of ML, especially in mathematics
and computer programming.
It is often convenient to think of a function as some kind of ‘black box’ that
can receive some kind of ‘input’ and, after some processing, will deliver some
‘output’. As we noted in Section 3.1.2, a function can, in principle, be regarded
as a lookup table and, in simple cases, functions can often be implemented
in that way. But in more complex cases, a simple lookup table would not be
appropriate, either because the size of the table would be finite but too large to
be practical or because the table would be infinitely large.
The remainder of this subsection describes with an example how the execu-
tion of simple functions may be modelled in ICMAUS and the next subsection
considers how the execution of the more complicated kinds of functions may be
understood within ICMAUS.
‘01111’ to be the outcome of the compression of a relatively small pattern like ‘0’?” Discussion
of the paradoxical way in which ICMAUS allows IC to have the effect of creating something
bigger than the original pattern is discussed briefly in Section 5.1, below, and more fully in
Wolff (2000).
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4.3.1 A Simple Function as a Look-up Table: A One-Bit Adder
Where a simple function is structured as a table, it can be processed by searching
for a row in the table where the input matches the input side of the row and
then reading off the corresponding output.
In ICMAUS, a table may be represented with a set of patterns like those
shown in Figure 10. These patterns define the function for the addition of two
one-bit numbers in binary arithmetic. The two digits immediately following ‘A’
in each row are the two one-bit numbers to be added together, the bit following
‘S’ is the sum of the two input bits, and the bit following ‘C’ is the carry-out bit,
to be carried to the next column. Thus, reading the results in each pattern from
right to left and writing them in the usual manner, the four possible results are
‘1 0’, ‘0 1’, ‘0 1’ and ‘0 0’, in order from the top row to the bottom.
A 1 1 S 0 C 1
A 1 0 S 1 C 0
A 0 1 S 1 C 0
A 0 0 S 0 C 0
Figure 10: Four patterns representing a table to define the function for the addition
of two one-bit numbers in binary arithmetic, with provision for the carrying out of one
bit. The meanings of the letters are described in the text.
Apart from their function in conveying the meanings of the bits to human
readers, service symbols (like ‘A’, ‘S’ and ‘C’) are needed to constrain the search
for possible alignments and, in effect, to tell the system which digits represent
the ‘input’ digits and which are ‘output’.11
Figure 11 shows the best alignment that has been found by SP61 with the
pattern ‘A 0 1 S C’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10 in Old. (Notice
that the first and last digit in each row is a row number, not part of the pattern
for that row.) Generally speaking, in ICMAUS the ‘result’ of an alignment is
the symbols in patterns from Old in the alignment that have not been aligned
with any symbols from New. The result in this case is ‘1’ for the sum bit and
‘0’ for the carry-out bit. In a very straightforward way, the matching process
has functioned as a process of ‘table lookup’ and has ‘selected’ the pattern in
Figure 10 that yields the ‘correct’ addition of ‘0’ and ‘1’ in binary arithmetic.
In general, any function that can be represented as a look-up table can be
represented in ICMAUS as a set of patterns and processed in essentially the
same way as the example of one-bit addition shown here.
11A distinction between ‘content’ symbols and ‘code’ symbols provides additional constraint
but the details are not relevant to the subject of this article and need not be spelled out here.
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0 A 0 1 S C 0
| | | | |
1 A 0 1 S 1 C 0 1
Figure 11: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘A 0 1 S C’ in New and the
patterns shown in Figure 10 in Old. The first and last digit in each row is a row
number, not part of the pattern for that row.
4.4 COMPOSITE FUNCTIONS AND THEIR EXECU-
TION
We saw in Section 3.1.2 that, although all functions in ML are defined abstractly
as a table of inputs and outputs, many functions do not look much like a table
and are very much more compact than the table that they represent. In later
parts of Section 3 we have seen that the succinctness of many functions, and
the succinctness of ML in general, can often be attributed to the exploitation
of our three simple compression techniques: chunking-with-codes, schema-plus-
correction and run-length coding.
So far, all of this seems to be reasonably straightforward. A complication,
however, is that when two or more functions are part of a higher-level function,
or when there is a repetition of a function two or more times, it is often necessary
for the output of one function to become the input of another function or for
the output of a function to become the input for another invocation of the same
function. Does this passing of information between functions represent any kind
of IC and, in particular, can it be modelled with ICMAUS?
The next subsection shows how, in a simple case, it can be modelled in
ICMAUS. And the following subsection considers this issue in more general
terms.
4.4.1 Adding Two-Bit Numbers or Larger
Conceptually, the simplest way to add together a pair of numbers containing
two or more bits is to apply the one-bit adder recursively to successive bits in
each of the two numbers which are to be added. And this means that it should
be possible for any carry-out bit from one application of the adder to become
the carry-in bit for the next application of the adder in the next higher column
of the addition.
In the jargon of computer engineering, a one-bit adder like the one shown in
Figure 10 is called a half adder (see Richards, 1955, pp. 83–89) because it lacks
any means of receiving a carry-in bit from the column immediately below. This
deficiency is made up in a full adder (see Richards, 1955, pp. 89–95), a version
of which is represented by the set of patterns shown in Figure 12. Here, the ‘C’
bit at the beginning of each pattern is the carry-in bit and all the other bits are
the same as in the half adder (Figure 10).
Notice that the pair of symbols ‘C ... #C’ marking the carry-in bit at the
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beginning of each pattern is the same as the symbols ‘C ... #C’ that mark
the carry-out bit at the end of the pattern. Matching of these pairs of symbols
allows the carry-out bit at any one level to become the carry-in bit at the next
higher level so that values can, in effect, be passed from level to level. This can
be seen in the example described next.
Consider, for example, how we may add together two three-bit numbers like
‘1 1 0’ and ‘0 1 1’. The two numbers need to be arranged so that the bits for
each level lie together and are marked in the same way as in the New pattern
in Figure 11. The order needs to be reversed to take account of the way the
SP61 model searches for alignments.12 Thus the sequence of symbols for these
two numbers should be: ‘A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A 0 1 S’. However, the symbols ‘C 0
#C’ need to be added at the beginning of New to ensure that the carry-in bit
for the first addition is ‘0’. So the final result is ‘C 0 #C A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A 0 1
S’.
The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘C 0 #C A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A 0 1
S’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 12 in Old is shown in Figure 13.
Ignoring the ‘service’ symbols, the sum of the two numbers can be read from this
alignment as the three ‘sum’ bits (each one between an ‘S’ and a ‘C’ column),
with the order reversed, and preceded on the left by the last carry-out bit on
the right of the alignment. The overall result is ‘1 0 0 1’. Readers will verify
easily enough that this is the correct sum of the binary numbers ‘1 1 0’ and ‘0
1 1’.
C 1 #C A 1 1 S 1 C 1 #C
C 1 #C A 0 1 S 0 C 1 #C
C 1 #C A 1 0 S 0 C 1 #C
C 0 #C A 1 1 S 0 C 1 #C
C 1 #C A 0 0 S 1 C 0 #C
C 0 #C A 0 1 S 1 C 0 #C
C 0 #C A 1 0 S 1 C 0 #C
C 0 #C A 0 0 S 0 C 0 #C
Figure 12: Eight patterns representing a table to define the function for the addition
of two one-bit numbers in binary arithmetic, with provision for the carrying in of a
digit as well as the carrying out of a digit. The meanings of the symbols are described
in the text.
4.4.2 Other Composite Functions
Compared with conventional systems, the method just shown for passing infor-
mation from one invocation of a function to another is somewhat inflexible. This
12In principle, SP61 can search for good alignments by processing all the symbols in New
together. But in practice, some types of good alignment (including the ones described here)
are much easier to find if the symbols from New are processed one at a time in left-to-right
order. And, in addition, it is natural to process columns in sequence from the lowest order to
the highest.
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0 C 0 #C A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A 0 1 S 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 C 0 #C A 1 0 S 1 C 0 #C | | | | | | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | | |
2 C 0 #C A 1 1 S 0 C 1 #C | | | | 2
| | | | | | |
3 C 1 #C A 0 1 S 0 C 1 #C 3
Figure 13: The best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘C 0 #C A 1 0 S A
1 1 S A 0 1 S’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 12 in Old.
is because it requires the ‘output’ variable to have the same name as the ‘input’
variable. In conventional systems there is a variety of notations for showing that
the output of one function becomes the input to another and none of them are
restricted in this way.
Modelling these more flexible methods in ICMAUS probably requires an
ability to model ‘scoping’ of variables and, possibly, an ability for ‘learning’.
Both these things are beyond what the SP61 model can do as it has been
developed to date and discussion of these issues would take up too much space
in this article.
4.5 PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND IC
Figure 14 shows four patterns representing a ‘truth table’ for the ‘exclusive OR’
logical proposition (p ∨ q. “Either p is true or q is true but they are not both
true”). Here, ‘1’ means TRUE and ‘0’ means FALSE, the first two digits in each
pattern are the truth values of p and q (individually) and, for each pattern, the
last digit, between the symbols ‘R .. #R’ , is the truth value of p ∨ q.
Readers will notice that the XOR truth table is very similar to the definition
of one-bit addition shown in Figure 10, not merely in the arrangement of the
digits but, more importantly, in the fact that both things can be represented as
a simple lookup table that can be represented by a set of patterns. It should be
no surprise that the XOR function can be evaluated by SP61 in essentially the
same way as with the function for one-bit addition.
XOR 1 1 R 0 #R
XOR 0 1 R 1 #R
XOR 1 0 R 1 #R
XOR 0 0 R 0 #R
Figure 14: Four patterns representing the ‘exclusive OR’ (XOR) truth table as de-
scribed in the text.
Again, one might expect to be able to evaluate combinations of simple propo-
sitions in ICMAUS in essentially the same way as was done for the addition of
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numbers containing two or more bits (Section 4.4.1). As before, this can be
achieved with the SP61 model in its current stage of development if outputs
are made to match inputs. This can be seen in the definition of ‘NOTXOR’
shown in Figure 15. Here, the alternative ‘outputs’ of the XOR proposition are
contained in the field ‘A ... #A’ and the same two symbols are used to mark
the possible ‘inputs’ of the truth table for NOT (that changes ‘1’ to ‘0’ and vice
versa).
NOTXOR XOR NOT R #R #NX
XOR 1 1 A 0 #A
XOR 1 0 A 1 #A
XOR 0 1 A 1 #A
XOR 0 0 A 0 #A
A 1 #A NOT R 0 #R
A 0 #A NOT R 1 #R
Figure 15: A set of patterns defining the ‘not XOR’ proposition as described in the
text.
Figure 16 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern
‘NOTXOR 0 1 A #NX’ in New and the patterns from Figure 15 in Old. In
the alignment, the digits ‘0’ and ‘1’ in New yield ‘A 1 #A’ as the ‘result’ of the
XOR component. These three symbols match the first three symbols in the first
of the two ‘NOT’ patterns and this yields ‘R 0 #R as the overall ‘result’ of the
NOTXOR proposition.
0 NOTXOR 0 1 A #NX 0
| | | | |
1 | XOR 0 1 A 1 #A | 1
| | | | | |
2 | | A 1 #A NOT R 0 #R | 2
| | | | | |
3 NOTXOR XOR NOT R #R #NX 3
Figure 16: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘NOTXOR 0 1 A #NX’ in New
and the patterns shown in Figure 15 in Old.
As in the case of adding numbers containing two or more digits, the ICMAUS
patterns that have been shown are somewhat contrived owing to the need to
make the output at one stage match the input at the next stage. It is anticipated
that more elegant solutions may be found when the SP61 has been further
developed.
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4.6 TRUE AND FALSE IN ICMAUS
Although readers may accept that, in broad terms, the matching and unification
of patterns in ICMAUS can model the kinds of inferences that can be made in
propositional logic, an objection may be raised that, in propositional logic per
se, every inference has only two values, TRUE or FALSE, whereas in ICMAUS,
there may be and often are alternative alignments for a given inference that
suggests that there are uncertainties attaching to the inferences that the system
makes.
ICMAUS applies most naturally to probabilistic reasoning (see Wolff, 1999b)
and this suggests that ‘exact’ reasoning may be seen as reasoning where prob-
abilities are very close to 0 or 1. In itself, this idea is not satisfactory owing to
uncertainties about the precise meaning of ‘close to’ in this context. A better
idea is to use explicit TRUE and FALSE values in ‘output’ fields (or ‘0’ and ‘1’
values as in the examples we have been considering), coupled with a focus always
on the ‘best’ alignment for any set of patterns. If alignments are created and
interpreted in this way then the effect of two-valued reasoning can be achieved
within the ICMAUS framework without ambiguity. An example is shown in the
next subsection.
4.7 SYLLOGISTIC REASONING
Consider the following text book example of a modus ponens syllogism:
1. All humans are mortal.
2. Socrates is human.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
In logical notation, this may be expressed as:
1. ∀x : human(x)⇒ mortal(x).
2. human(Socrates).
3. ∴ mortal(Socrates).
The traditional ‘strict’ interpretation in logic of syllogistic reasoning requires
explicit values (TRUE and FALSE) for propositions, in much the same style as
the ‘output’ fields of the XOR, NOT and NOTXOR functions shown above.
In the ICMAUS framework, the first of the propositions just shown may be
expressed with the pattern ‘X #X human true⇒ mortal true’. In the manner of
Skolemization, the variable ‘X #X’ in the pattern represents anything at all and
may thus be seen to be universally quantified. The scope of the variable may
be seen to embrace the entire pattern, without the need for it to be repeated.
The symbol ‘⇒’ in the ICMAUS pattern serves simply as a separator between
‘human true’ and ‘mortal true’.
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If this pattern is included (with other patterns) in Old and if New contains
the pattern ‘Socrates human true ⇒’ (corresponding to ‘human(Socrates)’ and,
in effect, a request to discover what that proposition implies), SP61 finds one
alignment (shown in Figure 17) that encodes all the symbols in New. After
unification to form the pattern ‘X Socrates #X human true ⇒ mortal true’, we
may read the alignment as a statement that because it is true that Socrates is
human it is also true that Socrates is mortal. In this reading, we ignore the
‘service’ symbols, ‘X’ and ‘#X’.
0 Socrates human true => 0
| | | |
1 X | #X human true => mortal true 1
| | |
2 X Socrates #X 2
Figure 17: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘Socrates human true ⇒’ in
New and patterns in Old that include ‘X #X human true ⇒ mortal true’.
Notwithstanding the probabilistic nature of the ICMAUS framework, there is
no ambiguity in an alignment like this because it is the only alignment formed
that encodes all the symbols in New. Given that we restrict our attention
to alignments of this kind, it is entirely possible for the framework to yield
deductions that are either TRUE or FALSE and not something in between.
4.8 PROBABILISTIC REASONING
Apart from the ‘strict’ logical interpretation of examples like the one above,
there is a more relaxed ‘everyday’ interpretation that allows statements and
inferences to have levels of confidence or ‘probabilities’. This kind of interpreta-
tion would view a proposition like “All humans are mortal” to be an inductive
generalisation about the world which, like all inductive generalisations, might
turn out to be wrong. Likewise, we may not be totally confident that Socrates
is human. As a consequence of uncertainties like these, the proposition that
“Socrates is mortal” may have some doubt attaching to it.
A relatively full discussion of the way the ICMAUS framework may be ap-
plied to probabilistic reasoning (including such things as default reasoning, non-
monotonic reasoning and ‘explaining away’) may be found in Wolff (1999b).
4.9 CHAINS OF REASONING
By now it should be clear that more complex kinds of reasoning, including
‘chains’ of reasoning, may be built up from simpler kinds, by arranging patterns
so that, by matching and unification of symbols, the ‘output’ of one stage can
determine the ‘input’ of the next stage. For example, simple ‘if ... then’ rules
of the kind that are the stock in trade of expert systems may be modelled in
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ICMAUS with patterns that associate conditions with actions or consequences
(e.g., “If smoke, then fire”, “If litmus paper is red, then solution is acid”).
In the simplest schematic terms, a rule like ‘IF A THEN B’ may, in ICMAUS,
be simplified to the association of ‘A’ and ‘B’ in a pattern like ‘A B’. Then
an argument like “A means C because A means B and B means C” can be
modelled by the alignment of an initial ‘A’ to the first ‘A’ in ‘A B’, followed by
the alignment of the two instances of ‘B’ in the patterns ‘A B’ and ‘B C’.
Readers wishing to pursue these ideas will find other examples and relevant
discussion in Wolff (1999b). For the purposes of this article, the key point here
is the way in which inferences may be understood in terms of IC arising from
the alignment of patterns and parts of patterns.
5 Discussion
Before concluding this article, let us consider briefly a few issues that relate to
the ideas that have been presented. There is insufficient space to discuss these
issues fully—this section merely flags their relevance and indicates some lines of
thinking.
5.1 THE PARADOX OF ‘DECOMPRESSION BY COM-
PRESSION’
Given the thesis that ML may be understood in terms of IC, it is reasonable to
ask how it is possible, as it clearly is, for decompression to be achieved by math-
ematical processes of calculation and inference. Newton’s formula, s = (gt2)/2,
may be seen as a compressed representation of the table relating distances trav-
elled by an object falling freely from rest in a given time. But, with ordinary
mathematical processes of calculation, the formula may be used to recreate large
numbers of rows in that table and thus decompress the information.
This paradox and how it may be resolved is discussed fairly fully in Wolff
(2000), with examples. In essence, the idea is to replace the original New with
an encoded, compressed version and run the system again. Generally, it will
recreate the original alignment (except for the substitution in New). Unification
of the new alignment yields the elements of the original New, in the same order,
together with ‘service’ symbols that can be ignored.
The reason that there is no real paradox is that the ‘query’ pattern used to
retrieve information is new information. It is the compression of this new infor-
mation by the unification of patterns that match each other that achieves the
retrieval of the previously compressed information. This retrieval of information
achieves the effect of decompression.
5.2 COULD IC BE A FOUNDATION FOR ML?
Rather than suppose that mathematics is founded on logic or vice versa, this
article has suggested that mathematics, logic and related disciplines may be
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seen to be founded on IC, itself the product of primitive operations of matching
and unification of patterns.
Possible objections to this thesis are that:
• Concepts of information that are the basis of methods for IC are couched
in mathematical terms and
• Mathematics is used in methods for IC, including the ICMAUS model.
A possible answer to the first point is that the Hartley-Shannon and AIT
concepts of information are themselves founded on a more primitive idea of
discriminable changes (patterns of variation) across one or more dimensions and
that the role of mathematics is to measure information, not define the concept
itself. Mathematics is useful as a way of giving precision to the measurement of
information but it is not the only way in which information may be measured
(see below).
In a similar vein, an answer to the second point is that mathematics can be
useful in methods for IC but that the core operations of matching and unifying
patterns do not, in themselves, use mathematical constructs.
Rather less certainly, it may be said that, although a concept like ‘frequency’
(which has an important role in discriminating amongst alternative ways in
which patterns may be matched and unified) may conveniently be expressed in
the form of numbers (that are clearly mathematical) the concept may equally
well be expressed as a non-numeric ‘strength’ of some kind of chemical or phys-
ical variable in a brain or computer. Much depends, of course, on what does or
does not count as being ‘mathematical’.
In general, there are alternatives to mathematics in the measurement of in-
formation, in compression of information and in the measurement of frequencies
of occurrence. The proof of these assertions is that all of these things can be
and often are done by brains and nervous systems in humans and other ani-
mals without the assistance of mathematical knowledge. It would be perverse
to say that a fox’s ability to learn where rabbits are most likely to be found is a
mathematical ability. Capabilities of this sort may be less accurate than those
that exploit mathematical techniques but they are useful for everyday living
and probably essential for survival of species through millions of years.
5.3 ML AND HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
Section 2.3.2 briefly reviewed some of the writings and research relating to the
idea that much of learning, perception and cognition in humans (and animals)
may be seen to be founded on information compression. In that section and
later it was suggested that concepts in ML may be seen to be an outgrowth or
development of this fundamental feature of human cognition.
Here we simply note this suggestion as a matter for further consideration in
the future. Relevant issues include the nature of the evidence that one might
recognise as being relevant to the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis,
whether or not the hypothesis yields insights into ML that might otherwise be
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missed and, in a similar way, whether the hypothesis leads to new insights into
human learning, perception and cognition.
5.4 MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICABILITY
The arguments and examples in this article may provide some solution to the
‘mystery’ of why mathematics is such a good “language of science”. As Barrow
says (1992, p. 247), “Science is, at root, just the search for compression in the
world”. If the arguments in this article are accepted, then mathematics is a good
medium for the expression of laws and other regularities in the world because
mathematics provides the kinds of mechanisms that are standardly used for IC,
with matching and unification of patterns at their core.
Notice that the usefulness of IC in this connection is not merely in reducing
the volume of scientific information (which may facilitate storage or transmission
of that information). At least as important is the intimate connection that
appears to exist between IC and the inductive prediction of the future from the
past (Section 2.3.3, above, and Section 5.5, below).
5.4.1 The World is Compressible
Barrow goes on to say [ibid., p. 247], “... the world is surprisingly compressible
and the success of mathematics in describing its workings is a manifestation of
that compressibility.”
It is interesting to reflect on what things would be like if the world (and
the universe) were not compressible. In accordance with AIT principles, such
a world would be totally random. This would mean that there would be no
‘structure’ of any kind, including the world itself, people, brains, computers
and, indeed, the structures of mathematics, logic and related disciplines. So
all of the things we have been discussing, including mathematics and science,
would not exist. Science and the expression of scientific truths in mathematics
can only exist because the world is compressible!
It is true that, out of all the possible patterns of information, compressible
patterns (containing regularities) are relatively rare (Li and Vita´nyi, 1997). If
surprisingness depends on rarity, then it is surprising that the world is compress-
ible. But since, in accordance with the anthropic principle, we can only exist in
a compressible world that accommodates persistent structures like ourselves, it
is not surprising that the world is compressible!
5.4.2 The Scope of Mathematics in Science
Mathematics is useful in many areas of science but it has limitations. The the-
ory of evolution by natural selection, which is by any standards a SUPERB
theory (to use Penrose’s word and emphasis) is not, fundamentally, mathemat-
ical. Mathematics can certainly be used to analyse aspects of evolution but the
theory in itself does not use any mathematical constructs (unless one adopts a
definition of mathematics that is so wide that it becomes meaningless). Again,
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there are many aspects of the world—like distributions of plants and animals
or patterns of political beliefs—that seem to be fundamentally ‘messy’ and not
amenable to ‘neat’ compression into mathematical formulae.
In short, mathematics is a good language of science but it is not the only
language for expressing regularities in the world. And there are many aspects
of the world that have not yet been compressed into compact formulae or any
other succinct representation and seem unlikely to yield to that treatment in
the future.
5.5 ML AND INDUCTIVE PREDICTION OF THE FU-
TURE FROM THE PAST
If the main thesis of this article is accepted, then it is accepted that ML is
founded on the same principles that appear to underlie concepts of probability
and probabilistic inductive inference. As we saw in Section 2.3.3 and later: there
is a very close connection between IC and concepts of probability; the ICMAUS
framework is based on MLE principles; and Solomonoff (1986) has argued that
the great majority of problems in science and mathematics can be seen as either
‘machine inversion’ problems or ‘time limited optimization’ problems, and that
both kinds of problems can be solved by inductive inference using the MLE
principle.
Of course, there are parts of mathematics to do with probability and there
are types of logic that are probabilistic. But, for many mathematicians and
logicians, the idea that mathematics or logic are founded on the same principles
that underlie concepts of probability and probabilistic inductive inference may
be hard to accept. It is, after all, the highly predictable ‘clockwork’ nature of
these disciplines that gives them their appeal.
There is no space here to discuss these issues fully. Five points are noted
here briefly:
• Non-determinism and associated uncertainties can appear in the Turing
model itself, depending on the transition function built into the model.
Likewise, the Post Canonical System model can exhibit non-determinism,
depending on the productions provided in the model.
• Section 4.6 described briefly how the effect of two-valued logic might be
obtained in a system that is otherwise geared to probabilistic reasoning.
• As we saw in Section 4.7, some kinds of syllogistic argument can be seen
to have inductive origins.
• That mathematics may not, fundamentally, be quite as ‘clockwork’ as is
commonly supposed has been suggested by Chaitin (1988, p. 80): “I
have recently been able to take a further step along the path laid out by
Go¨del and Turing. By translating a particular computer program into an
algebraic equation of a type that was familiar even to the ancient Greeks,
I have shown that there is randomness in the branch of pure mathematics
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known as number theory. My work indicates that—to borrow Einstein’s
metaphor—God sometimes plays dice with whole numbers.”
• The idea that we can only exist in a compressible world (Section 5.4.1,
above) seems to provide an answer to the problem of finding a rational
basis for inductive reasoning. Of course, we cannot justify such reasoning
by saying that it has always worked in the past—because this simply
invokes the principle we are trying to justify. A better answer seems to be
as follows:
– The assumption that the future will repeat the past is equivalent to
the assumption that there is information redundancy between past
and future.
– If we make that assumption and it turns out to be true, then we will
reap the benefits of inductive reasoning—remembering where food or
shelter can be found, avoiding dangers, and so on.
– If we make that assumption and it turns out to be false, the universe
will have exploded into total randomness (or exploded and reformed
into totally unrecognisable patterns) and we are dead anyway!
– In short, there is no downside risk to the assumption that the past
is a guide to the future and a very substantial upside if it turns out
to be true. Hence, it is a rational assumption to make.
This line of thinking is similar to Reichenbach’s “pragmatic vindica-
tion” of induction (see, for example, Salmon, 1991).
5.6 RECONCILING THE INEVITABILITY OF MATH-
EMATICS WITH ITS APPLICABILITY
Potter (2000) writes that the chief philosophical problem posed by arithmetic
is “that of reconciling its inevitability—the impression we have that it is true
no matter what—with its applicability.” (p. 1). Presumably, the same can be
said about mathematics as a whole and, indeed, logic.
This section has already suggested a reason why ML is so applicable: because
it is an embodiment of standard techniques for information compression and,
as such, it provides a convenient means of describing the world in a succinct
manner and, perhaps more importantly, it gives us a handle on the inductive
prediction of the future from the past.
What about the ‘inevitability’ of arithmetic and other aspects of ML? The
first point in this connection is that, as was noted above, the work of Go¨del,
Turing, Chaitin and others has shown that arithmetic, at least, has a proba-
bilistic aspect (“God sometimes plays dice with whole numbers”): it may not
be as true as is commonly assumed that 2 + 2 = 4, no matter what. That said,
any ‘fuzziness’ in arithmetic is not apparent in its everyday applications and it
is still pertinent to ask why the laws of arithmetic are amongst the most certain
things that we can know.
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The view of ML that has been sketched in this article suggests possible
reasons for the certainties of arithmetic and, indeed, the uncertainties too:
• With the simple kinds of patterns that seem to form the basis of nat-
ural numbers (Section 4.2, above), ICMAUS often yields an alignment
that stands out very clearly as better in terms of compression than any
of the alternative alignments—because simple patterns impose relatively
tight constraints on the number of alternative ways in which symbols may
be matched and unified. This phenomenon may be responsible for our
subjective impression of the inevitability of arithmetic truths.
• The uncertainties and paradoxes of ML (Go¨del’s theorems, the Halting
Problem, Chaitin’s work, Russell’s paradox, etc) seem all to arise from
the infinite regress of recursion that can occur in ML systems. This sits
comfortably with the ICMAUS view of ML because recursion can easily
arise in the matching and unification of patterns (as we saw in Section
4.2).
6 Conclusion
I hope that the view of mathematics, logic and related disciplines that is pre-
sented in this article will prove interesting to readers. It is a long way from
being any kind of ‘proof’ that ML is based on IC but may provide a perspective
that stimulates new thinking about the nature of mathematics, logic and related
disciplines, and new insights into those disciplines.
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